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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. The Accident 
 
This matter comes before this court on appeal from an 
order entered September 18, 1998, in this insurance 
coverage declaratory judgment action. The case arises from 
a motor vehicle accident in Warren County, Pennsylvania, 
on July 9, 1992, in which Iva L. Clover was seriously and 
permanently injured. As a result of the accident, Clover is 
now paraplegic and already has incurred more than $1.5 
million in medical bills. In April 1993, Clover and her 
husband settled their bodily injury and loss of consortium 
claims with the driver of the other vehicle for $620,000, an 
amount equal to the full amount of the driver's automobile 
liability insurance coverage, as well as an out of pocket 
payment from the driver's employer. 
 
Following this settlement, the Clovers filed a claim for 
underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits provided in a non- 
trucking liability policy issued by appellant Assicurazioni 
Generali, S.P.A. The policy covered three tractor trailer 
units Iva Clover's son Leroy Anderson owned and operated 
but leased to Advanced Distribution System, Inc. ("ADS"), a 
subsidiary of Intrenet, Inc., an Indiana corporation. The 
policy, of course, did not cover the vehicle Clover occupied 
at the time of the accident. At that time the Clovers were 
living with Anderson in Bear Lake, Pennsylvania. 
 
B. The Policy 
 
The circumstances leading to the issuance of the policy 
were as follows. ADS and other Intrenet affiliates lease 
trucking equipment from owner-operators like Anderson. In 
November 1991, Anderson executed a so-called permanent 
lease for certain tractors with ADS through its agent, Perrin 
Trucking, located in Warren, Pennsylvania. As an incentive 
to owner-operators like Anderson to lease their vehicles, 
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Intrenet and its affiliates offered them physical damage 
insurance for their leased equipment at group rates lower 
than those that they could have obtained on their own. 
Similarly, Intrenet and ADS also made non-trucking 
liability insurance available to the owner-operators at group 
rates. This insurance protected the lessee corporations 
against liability for damage caused by the owner-operators 
and their drivers while they were not performing duties for 
the corporations. Thus "non-trucking" refers to the use of 
the vehicle rather than the type of vehicle covered. The 
lessee corporations needed protection against such liability 
because their names appeared on the equipment itself. 
 
As part of his business relationship with ADS, Anderson 
obtained both physical damage and non-trucking liability 
group insurance through Intrenet. Generali issued the 
policies, which were in effect at the time of Clover's 
accident, to Intrenet, Inc. and its affiliates. The policies 
covered approximately 1500 permanently-leased pieces of 
equipment, including the three units leased by Anderson. 
In order to supply the drivers of the equipment with proof 
of insurance, Generali, through its agents, provided 
certificates of insurance to the owner-operators. The 
certificates issued to Anderson for his vehicles listed "Leroy 
Anderson and Advanced Distribution Systems" under the 
word "Insured." 
 
The non-trucking liability policy at issue included various 
endorsements called "Indiana Changes" and included an 
endorsement in large capitalized type titled "INDIANA 
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
COVERAGE." The endorsement allowed an "insured" to 
recover compensatory damages for "bodily injury" and 
"property damage" caused by the driver of an uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicle. The endorsement defined the 
term insured as follows: 
 
       Who Is an Insured 
 
       1. You 
 
       2. If you are an individual, any `family member.' 
 
       3. Anyone else `occupying' a covered `auto' or a 
       temporary substitute for a covered `auto.' . . . 
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       4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to rec over 
       because of `bodily injury' sustained by another 
       `insured.' 
 
The endorsement defined "family member" as"a person 
related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a 
resident of your household . . . ." The second page of the 
non-trucking liability policy itself, rather than the UIM 
endorsement, further provided: "Throughout this policy the 
words `your' [sic]1 and`your' [sic] refer to the Named 
insured shown in the Declarations. The words `we' `us' and 
`our' refer to the Company providing this insurance." The 
declaration page, in turn, listed the "Insured's 
Name/Address" as "Intrenet, Inc., et al. P.O. Box 248, 
Rockport, Indiana 47635." Additionally, Generali issued an 
endorsement, which became a part of the policy, that 
provided a named insured schedule. This schedule listed 
Intrenet, ADS, and other Intrenet affiliates as named 
insureds, but did not list Anderson or the other owner- 
operators. 
 
Finally, as significant here, the UIM endorsement 
contained an arbitration clause that stated in relevant part: 
 
       a. If we and an `insured' disagree whether the`insured' 
       is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or 
       driver of an `uninsured motor vehicle' or `underinsured 
       motor vehicle' or do not agree as to the amount of 
       damages, either party may make a written demand for 
       arbitration. . . . 
 
       b. . . . A decision agreed to by two of the arbitr ators 
       will be binding as to: 
 
       1. Whether the `insured' is legally entitled to  recover 
       damages, and 
 
       2. The amount of damages. . . . 
 
App. at 732. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As Generali points out, Br. at 13 n.2, the first word clearly was meant 
to be "you" instead of "your." 
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C. The Litigation 
 
After the Clovers notified Generali through its agents2 
that they would be claiming bodily injury and loss of 
consortium benefits under the UIM endorsement, Generali 
brought this declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 2201 and 2202, seeking a ruling that Clover is not an 
"insured" according to the policy's terms. See Assicurazioni 
Generali, S.P.A. v. Clover, 18 F. Supp.2d 550, 551 (W.D. Pa. 
1998). Generali also sought rulings on questions regarding 
the stacking of insurance policies and set off of funds 
already recovered. See id. The parties thenfiled cross- 
motions for summary judgment, with Generali arguing that 
the court should resolve the substantive issues in the case 
by applying Indiana law, and the Clovers claiming that 
Pennsylvania law governed and that therefore all 
substantive issues would have to be resolved through 
arbitration. See id. 
 
After determining that there was a conflict between 
Pennsylvania and Indiana law with respect to the issues 
posed, the district court applied Pennsylvania's choice of 
law rules as established in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964). According to the district court, 
Griffith required it to determine the applicable law by 
performing both the contacts analysis provided in the 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws S 188(2) (1971) and 
an interests and policies analysis. See 18 F. Supp.2d at 
556-58. The court concluded that under both of these tests 
Pennsylvania law should be applied. Accordingly, inasmuch 
as under Pennsylvania law the arbitration clause in the 
policy would be interpreted to require arbitration of all 
issues, the court dismissed the action in order to allow the 
parties to proceed to arbitration. Thus, the district court 




2. Generali is a surplus lines carrier and is not an admitted insurance 
carrier in the United States; the company conducts its business in this 
country through its authorized agent, Alexander & Alexander, an 
Oklahoma corporation. Generali's claims adjuster is Ron Coleman & 
Associates, which is incorporated in the state of Virginia. 
 




A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The district court had jurisdiction in this diversity of 
citizenship action under 28 U.S.C. SS 1332, 2201, and 
2202, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
Because Generali appeals from the district court's grant of 
a motion for summary judgment, our review is plenary. See 
Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
B. The Parties' Choice of Law 
 
The district court in this diversity action was obligated to 
apply the forum's, namely Pennsylvania's choice of law 
rules in resolving the parties' dispute over which law 
applied to the policy. See Shuder v. McDonald's Corp., 859 
F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1988). Both Pennsylvania law and 
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws provide that the first 
question to be answered in addressing a potential conflict 
of laws dispute is whether the parties explicitly or implicitly 
have chosen the relevant law. See Smith v. Commonwealth 
Nat'l Bank, 557 A.2d 775, 777 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); see 
also Restatement (Second) Conflict of LawsS 187 (1971). 
Nevertheless the district court simply assumed without an 
articulated analysis that the parties had not indicated any 
intention regarding the law that would apply in interpreting 
the policy. See 18 F. Supp.2d at 556 ("In the absence of an 
effective choice of law by the parties themselves,S 188 of 
the Restatement . . . provides [as follows]."). 
 
It is true that the non-trucking liability policy and the 
UIM endorsement do not contain an explicit choice of law 
clause. However, as the district court recognized, the policy 
was "drafted in accordance with Indiana law, and includes 
the UIM Endorsement required by that state." Id. Indeed, as 
we have indicated, the endorsement is titled, in large 
capital letters, "INDIANA UNINSURED AND 
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE." Thus, it is the 
Indiana UIM endorsement itself not merely the policy, 
which contains the arbitration clause whose scope is at 
issue. Further, Generali issued Indiana changes as 
endorsements to the policy. 
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The Restatement makes clear that a contract's references 
to the laws of a particular state may provide persuasive 
evidence that the parties to the contract intended for that 
state's law to apply. See Restatement S 187 cmt. a. The 
repeated references to Indiana law in the endorsement, and 
Generali's unmistakable intent that the UIM coverage as set 
forth in the endorsement not only comply with, but clearly 
track Indiana law, demonstrate that the parties at least 
implicitly and perhaps even explicitly chose Indiana law to 
govern the policy's terms. Consequently, the district court 
should have considered the content of the endorsement 
itself, rather than an interest analysis as determinative. 
Accordingly, it should have applied Indiana law, as the 
endorsement to the insurance policy contemplated, to 
determine the scope of the arbitration provision that was 
incorporated within its terms. 
 
The Clovers attempt to avoid the result that Indiana law 
applies on a choice of law selection basis with an argument 
that an "Out of State Coverage Extensions" section in the 
policy requires the application of Pennsylvania law to the 
entire dispute. But this section merely provides that when 
a "covered auto," such as one of Anderson's tractor trailers, 
is away from the state where it is licensed, Generali will 
honor the liability limits and types of coverage required by 
the jurisdiction of use. This section in no way is germane 
here as Clover was indisputably not in a "covered auto" at 
the time of her accident. Furthermore, this section does not 
suggest that the foreign jurisdiction's law will control 
interpretation of the policy's terms. Instead, it merely states 
that the level of coverage required by the jurisdiction in 
which the covered auto is operated will be honored. The 
inclusion of this provision in the policy simply does not 
affect the conclusion that Indiana law was chosen to govern 
interpretation of the policy's terms. 
 
We recognize that courts sometimes do not enforce choice 
of law clauses in adhesion contracts due to the differential 
in bargaining power between the parties. This reasoning, 
however, does not apply to group insurance contracts, at 
least in the circumstances here. See Eugene F. Scoles and 
Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws S18.5 at 666-67 (2d ed. 1992). 
When, as in this case, a business entity such as Intrenet 
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obtains a group insurance contract that applies to 
individuals in various states, both the insurer and the 
organization have an arguable interest in establishing 
uniform procedures by specifying a particular state's law to 
apply to future disputes. See id. at 667. Further, a choice 
of law made by the insurer is less suspect in the group 
insurance context as the greater bargaining leverage 
possessed by the group agent should protect the insureds 
from unfavorable law. See id. Thus, there is no barrier to 
applying Indiana law to determine the scope of the 
arbitration clause in the policy. 
 
C. The Consequence of the Choice of Indiana Law 
 
The application of Indiana law will result in the 
unremarkable consequence that the district court on 
remand will resolve the legal issues in dispute. As Generali 
argues, the arbitration clause in Anderson's UIM policy 
would not be interpreted in Indiana as requiring arbitration 
of the scope of insurance coverage. See Liddy v. Companion 
Ins. Co., 390 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). In 
Liddy, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered the 
meaning of an arbitration clause that was nearly identical 
to the clause at issue in this case as it provided: 
 
       Arbitration: If any person making claim hereunder and 
       the company do not agree that such person is legally 
       entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator 
       of an uninsured automobile . . . or do not agree as to 
       the amount of payment which may be owing under this 
       Coverage, then . . . the matter or matters upon which 
       such person and the company do not agree shall be 
       settled by arbitration . . . . 
 
Id. at 1024. The court concluded that such language 
allowed for arbitration on two issues only: "(1) whether or 
not the insured or his personal representative is legally 
entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of 
an uninsured automobile, and (2) if so, the amount of 
damages which the insured or his personal representative 
is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of 
the uninsured automobile." Id. at 1028. Thus, the Indiana 
Court of Appeals clearly has rejected the suggestion that an 
arbitration clause such as the one at issue in this case 
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requires arbitration of a coverage, stacking, and set off 
dispute. While we are not bound by a decision of an 
intermediate state court of appeals as to state law, such an 
opinion is entitled to serious consideration, see Robinson v. 
Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 
1993), and the Clovers acknowledge that Liddy correctly 
states Indiana law. Br. at 25. 
 
We recognize that sometimes there are public policy 
issues implicated in insurance disputes but we have no 
reason to believe that Pennsylvania would decline to give 
effect to a UIM provision that requires that a court rather 
than arbitrators decide the issues implicated in this case. 
Surely Indiana's preference for judicial resolution of the 
issues cannot be thought to be against "public health, 
safety, morals or welfare." See Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. 
Co., 711 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 1998). Moreover, while 
arbitration clauses have been applied broadly, still in recent 
times there has been a certain retreat from that approach 
in favor of the use of judicial remedies. See , e.g., Wright v. 
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S.Ct. 391, 396 (1998). 
 
Furthermore, we have not overlooked the Clovers' 
argument that the Pennsylvania Uninsured Motorist 
Coverage Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, SS 2000 et seq. (West 
1992), and the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. ___ 1701 et seq. 
(West 1996), should be liberally construed in favor of 
finding coverage. See e.g., Jeffrey v. Erie Ins. Exch., 621 
A.2d 635, 641 & n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Rather, we do 
not find that that principle is implicated here as we are not 
addressing the scope of coverage under those statutes but 
are determining only a choice of law question without 
regard for its ultimate effect on the outcome of the dispute. 
In any event, the Pennsylvania approach in favor of 
coverage cannot overcome the straightforward wording of 
the insurance policy and UIM endorsement provisions 
which control our result. 
 
Ultimately the crucial question in this case will be 
whether Clover is covered by the UIM endorsement as her 
son's family member. At least at this time the parties are 
not disputing the legal liability of the tortfeasor who caused 
Clover's injuries. Therefore, according to Indiana law, the 
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key disputes in this case are not arbitrable under the UIM 
arbitration clause and a court must resolve the coverage 
issue and, if necessary, the stacking and set off disputes. 




For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the order of the 
district court of September 18, 1998, and will remand the 
case to the district court for it to decide the coverage issues 
now in dispute. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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